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TEACHING MORAL
VALUES IN PUBLIC
SCHOOLS
Some Constitutional Considerations
DAVID L. GREGORY*
A renaissance is occurring in the theory, if not yet in the practice,
regarding the appropriate function of teaching moral values in public ele-
mentary and secondary schools. The generally informed and prominent
attention now focused on the pressing need to develop students' ability to
make sound moral judgments in a very complex society is grounds for
cautious optimism. Fortunately, the recently resurgent emphasis on
teaching students how to make informed moral choice, as an indispensa-
ble ingredient of any civilized society, is much more than a reflexive back-
lash to pedagogical relativism.
Especially during the past twenty years, most public schools have
taken great pains to avoid inculcation of ethics. This regrettable value-
neutrality is partially attributable to increasing cultural relativism. It is
also attributable to misunderstanding the religion clauses of the first
amendment of the Constitution. Understandably, few public school offi-
cials are eager to endure the legal expense and controversy of becoming
the Supreme Court's next major test case. However, the deliberate avoid-
ance of moral values in public education transcended prudent legal con-
siderations. Pandemic cultural relativism has afflicted all of society, with
particularly disastrous consequences on an increasingly ignorant, unedu-
cated, yet purportedly credentialed, population.' Court decisions and the
* Kenneth Wang Research Professor of Law, 1987-88, St. John's University School of Law;
B.A., Catholic University of America, 1973; M.B.A., Wayne State University, 1977; J.D.,
University of Detroit, 1980; LL.M., Yale University Law School, 1982; J.S.D., Yale Univer-
sity Law School, 1987.
A. BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND (1987); E.D. HIRSCH, JR., CULTURAL LITER-
ACY (1987).
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Constitution were misperceived as somehow mandating value-free, and,
ultimately, valueless public education.
Within this decade, more responsible public officials from across the
entire political spectrum" and many influential public educators have en-
dorsed the teaching of moral values in public schools.2 This article will
examine these recent positive developments through the prism of consti-
tutional law. Hopefully, the discussion can move beyond single issue, sim-
plistic no-win advocacy, mandating which particular ethical values should
be taught, at the expense of the rights of other persons who do not share
those same values.' Instead, the task is to base public education on sound
moral values within the bounds of the Constitution, while simultaneously
respecting the heterogeneity of our republic in this bicentennial year.
American law in the twentieth century is permeated with the secular
philosophy of pragmatism. This empirical, "real world" perspective on
the law has been the United States' distinct, and perhaps unique, contri-
bution to jurisprudence. Legal pragmatism reflects the wisdom borne of
our Civil War, our commercial expansion, and the broad legal develop-
ments generally consonant with the spirit of laissez-faire capitalism. Oli-
ver Wendell Holmes, Massachusetts Brahmin, scion of Harvard, Civil
War colonel, and eminent justice of both the Massachusetts and United
States Supreme Court, is perhaps most responsible for integrating the ju-
risprudence of European positivism into American law. Perhaps his most
famous pragmatic aphorism is that "the life of the law has not been logic
- it has been experience."" Holmes, the intellectual grandfather of
American legal realism,' unquestionably ushered overtly secular, empiri-
cal qualities into our jurisprudence. Concomitantly, the jurisprudence of
pragmatism and realism deliberately deemphasized the theological, spiri-
See N.Y. Times, June 7, 1987, at Al, col. 1; N.Y. Times, May 24, 1987, § 4, at 7, col. 6;
N.Y. Times, May 3, 1987, at § 4, at 27, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1987, at C9, col. 1; N.Y.
Times, Apr. 19, 1987, at § 4, at 18, col. 1. See also N.Y. Times, May 12, 1987, at B6, col. 1
("What concerns me is that we're becoming a bland society, valueless." (quoting White
House Chief of Staff Howard Baker)); EDUCATION FOR DEMOCRACY: A STATEMENT ON PRINCI-
PLES (1987) (joint pamphlet project of the American Federation of Teachers, the Education
Excellence Network, and Freedom House); M. Cuomo, Religion, Belief, and Public Moral-
ity, 31 N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS, Oct. 25, 1984, at 32. "'I am for morality. In fact, I wish there
were more of it taught in our schools.'" TIME, May 25, 1987, at 17 (quoting President Ron-
ald Reagan).
3 See supra note 2.
O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881); see Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L.
REV. 457 (1897).
For the representative scholarship of American legal realism, at its height in the late
1920's and early 1930's at the Yale and Columbia Law Schools, see J. FRANK, LAW AND THE
MODERN MIND (1930); L. KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960 (1986); K. LLEWELLYN,
THE BRAMBLE BUSH (1951); Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Pro-
fessional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943).
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tual values that had historically been at the heart of the Judeo-Christian
natural law tradition. Thus, within the last century, jurisprudence was
transmogrified from the propaedeutic to theology into instead the pri-
mary instrument of power in the service of the controlling elites of the
secular state. Within the past decade, critical legal scholars,6 the contem-
porary heirs of legal realism, have further attacked reliance on jurispru-
dential absolutes. The heavy integration of the European continental
philosphy of Kant, Hegel, Husserl, and Marx into contemporary Ameri-
can legal philosophy,7 and the increasing use of deconstructive linguistic
techniques to critique legal texts,8 have further contributed to the spread
of intellectual, legal, and cultural relativism.9
Contemporary constitutional law has been deeply and profoundly af-
fected by these important jurisprudential changes. The classic positivist
position that law and morality must remain completely separate has un-
derstandably prospered in light of these contemporary jurisprudential de-
velopments. This makes it all the more imperative to remember the ring-
ing words of Eugene Rostow, constitutional scholar and former Dean of
the Yale Law School; by their very nature, law and morality are inextrica-
bly joined. Each mirrors the other. Rostow rhetorically queried, what
does the law accomplish, and what is its purpose, if the law does not legis-
late morality?' 0
Never has this question been more apt, compelling, and timely. Law,
if radically divorced from morality, ultimately becomes a contradiction in
terms and makes a cruel mockery of assuredly then-unattainable justice.
At its root, American law is grounded upon moral values. Fully consonant
with classic natural law, American law and equity still form the synergy
necessary to achieve justice. The Constitution is thoroughly grounded
upon this rich natural law tradition. Rather than being antithetical to
moral values, constitutional law is steeped in these considerations. It is
not coincidental that the religion clauses begin the first amendment:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof."" The Framers of the Constitution
' For a comprehensive list of representative critical legal scholarship, see Kennedy & Klare,
A Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies, 94 YALE L.J. 461 (1984).
See Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133
U. PA. L. REv. 685 (1985); Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 1151
(1985).
" Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743 (1987).
• A. BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND (1987); see also P. SOPER, A THEORY OF
LAW (1984) (arguing that positivism has been misdirected for divorcing law from moral
theory).
1* See POWER AND POLICY IN QUEST OF LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF EUGENE VICTOR RosTOw
(M. McDougal & W. Reisman eds. 1985).
" U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Constitution's other reference to religion is the proscription
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thoroughly learned the bitter and bloody lessons of Henry VIII and En-
glish history. They were determined to ensure that the secular govern-
ment would never "establish" or impose a state religion upon the people
of the United States. Further, the Framers also took equal pains to safe-
guard individual free exercise of religion.
Ultimately, neither the establishment nor the free exercise clause is
absolute. There is often potential tension between the two religion clauses
of the first amendment. Prominent constitutional law scholar Professor
Laurence Tribe 2 of Harvard Law School, quoting former Chief Justice
Warren Burger, has expressly noted that:
[a] pervasive difficulty in the constitutional jurisprudence of the religion
clauses has accordingly been the struggle to find a neutral course between
the two Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms, and ei-
ther of which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the
other.'3
While it is possible that the Constitution's religion clauses may peri-
odically conflict with one another,'4 neither clause prohibits the teaching
of moral values in the public schools.
Catholics historically have been understandably and especially wary
of the willingness of the non-Catholic political majority to fully protect
Catholic religious rights. As victims of religious bigotry throughout much
of the nation's history, Catholics have begun to come into proportionate
national political power only during the past quarter century. Like other
religious minorities, Catholics have thus had a deep mistrust of the judici-
ary's willingness to safeguard Catholic constitutional rights. United States
Supreme Court Associate Justice Joseph Story, author of the influential
multivolume Commentaries On The Constitution,6 maintained that the
First Amendment religion clauses protected only mainstream Protestants.
that "no religious [tlest shall ever be required as a [q]ualification to any [oiffice or public
[tirust under the United States." U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 3.
" See L. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT (1985); L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL
CHOICES (1985); L. TRIBE, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1978); Gregory, Book Review, 60
TUL. L. REV. 437 (1985). See, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 1519 (1987). Pro-
fessor Tribe successfully represented Pennzoil before the United States Supreme Court.
3 L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 815 (1978) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970)).
" For thorough citations to the evolution of the history and the jurisprudence of the first
amendment religion clauses, and for further elaboration of the tensions within the amend-
ment, see Gregory, The First Amendment Religion Clauses and Labor Employment Law in
the Supreme Court, 1984 Term, 31 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 1, 2-13 (1986); Religion and the
State, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 833 (1986); Developments in the Law-Religion and the
State: The Complex Interaction Between Religion and Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1612
(1987).
" See J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (5th ed. 1891).
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Fringe groups, such as Catholics and Jews, were not intended to be pro-
tected, according to the single most influential constitutional commenta-
tor of the nineteenth century. In his dissent in the recent school prayer
case of Wallace v. Jaffree in 1985,6 Justice Rehnquist resurrected and
cited the Story position with express approval, maintaining that the first
amendment permitted state preferences for religion, short only of official
state establishment of any particular religion." If this ominous accom-
modationist view persuades a majority of the Court, the specter of state-
sanctioned and constitutionally protected Protestant majoritarianism and
the concomitant debilitation of the free exercise rights of Catholics and
other religious minorities will again haunt this country.
Despite the nation's history of considerable anti-Catholic prejudice,
the Supreme Court has also been a champion of protecting Catholic reli-
gious rights. In the landmark decision Pierce v. Society of Sisters in
1925,18 the Court upheld the right to provide elementary education via
private religious schools. The Court thus forcefully repudiated the viru-
lent anti-Catholic attempt to eradicate Catholic elementary and second-
ary schools and to force all Catholic children to attend only public
schools. However, the popular perception is that Pierce is the rare excep-
tion, proving the rule of value-neutral, almost anti-religious, public edu-
cation effectuated under the establishment clause pretext of respecting
the proper "wall" of separation between church and state.'9
Perhaps the single most controversial, lightning-rod decision popu-
larly representing Court-endorsed antagonism toward moral values in
public education is School District of Abington Township v. Schempp.20
Brought, in part, by the notorious atheist Maddlyn Murray O'Hare,
Schempp represented the supposed judicial ban on bible reading in pub-
lic schools. This perception was reinforced by the ban on the bare posting
472 U.S. 38 (1985).
See id. at 104 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
The true meaning of the Establishment Clause can only be seen in its history...
The Framers intended the Establishment clause to prohibit the designation of any
church as a "national" one. The Clause was also designed to stop the Federal Govern-
ment from asserting a preference for one religious denomination or sect over others.
Given the "incorporation" of the Establishment Clause as against the States via the
Fourteenth Amendment .... States are prohibited as well from establishing a reli-
gion or discriminating between sects. As its history abundantly shows, however, noth-
ing in the Establishment Clause requires government to be strictly neutral between
religion and irreligion, nor does that Clause prohibit Congress or the States from pur-
suing legitimate secular ends through nondiscriminatory sectarian means.
Id. at 113 (citations omitted).
II 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
" For extensive discussion of the metaphor of the "wall" of separation between church and
state, originally attributed to Thomas Jefferson, see Gregory, supra note 14, at 7-9, n.14.
20 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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of the Ten Commandments in a Kentucky public school in Stone v. Gra-
ham in 1980.21 Further, in 1985, the Court struck down an Alabama stat-
ute that had expressly encouraged voluntary prayer through the statutory
moment of silence at the beginning of the public school day in Wallace v.
Jaffree.21
None of these decisions was inherently antithetical to the inculcation
of moral values in public school education. The Court recognized that the
Bible could be taught in the context of a literature, history, or compara-
tive religion class in public school2 3 Likewise, the Ten Commandments
could also be taught in such a broader context. Contrary to the popular
misconceptions surrounding many of its very scrupulous establishment
cases, 2 4 the Court has never banned religious values per se in public
schools. Rather, due judicial regard for the first amendment establish-
ment clause has only prohibited state-sponsored "voluntary" prayer.2 No
teacher or student has ever been constitutionally prohibited from individ-
ual and personal silent prayer in the public school. In Bender v. Wil-
liamsport Area School District in 1986,2" the Supreme Court endorsed
the free exercise right of a Christian student prayer group to meet on
public school property and during school hours, without violating the es-
tablishment clause.
For the forthcoming 1987-1988 term, the Court has granted certiorari
to hear a "moment-of-silence" case emanating from New Jersey.2 Unlike
the Alabama statute struck down in Wallace v. Jaffree, the New Jersey
statute, similar to those present in about half the states, simply provides
for a moment of silence at the beginning of the school day. The statute
does not expressly encourage prayer, although it is likely that many stu-
dents may individually choose to pray in silence during this statutory mo-
ment. Thus, the New Jersey statute's respect for cultural and religious
heterogeneity may sufficiently protect everyone's free exercise rights
while simultaneously not running afoul of the establishment clause. In
599 S.W.2d 157 (Ky.), rev'd, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
472 U.S. 38 (1985).
" See School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
24 See N.Y. Times, July 10, 1985, at A13, col. 1 (Attorney General Meese called the deci-
sions "'bizarre.' "). E.g., N.Y. Times, July 3, 1985, at A19, col. 2 (Secretary of Education
Bennett criticized the Supreme Court's 1985 decisions striking down public aid programs to
private schools as a "'ridiculous' expression of the court's 'fastidious disdain for religion
that is hard to fathom.'" He called the decisions 'crazy,' 'terrible,' and 'badly reasoned.' ").
25 It is dubious whether any voluntary prayer is ever fully "voluntary," especially given peer
influence in the lower grades. One law school constitutional law class has been the setting
for demonstrating that "voluntary" prayer may be something substantially less than truly
voluntary. Day, Teaching Constitutional Law: Role-Playing the Supreme Court, 36 J. LE-
GAL EDuc. 268 (1986).
20 475 U.S. 534 (1986).
27 May v. Cooperman, 780 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 946 (1987).
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1985, Justice O'Connor expressly suggested in Wallace v. Jaffree that
such a statute may pass constitutional muster.28
From this battery of case law, it is clear that neither the Constitution
nor the Supreme Court is inherently antithetical to the inculcation of
moral values in public education. The establishment clause mandates
that such religious or value based education must be effectuated in a
broader educational context. The schools must carefully avoid govern-
ment sponsorship of any particular set of values to the exclusion of any-
one else's religious or moral values. No one's free exercise of religion right
can be fostered to the detriment of any other citizen's equally important
and constitutionally protected free exercise right. Obviously, this is a very
delicate and difficult, but not impossible, objective for responsible public
educators to implement. Respect for cultural and religious heterogeneity
under the auspices of the Constitution is the key to whether the public
schools may teach moral values in an effective and constitutional manner.
Catholics must be particularly sensitive to the critical importance of
constitutionally respecting both the establishment and free exercise
clauses of the first amendment. Were it not for the Court's appreciation
of cultural and religious heterogeneity over a half century ago in Pierce v.
Society of Sisters,9 private Catholic elementary and secondary schools
could have been abolished and all Catholic children forced to attend pub-
lic school. Fortunately, the free exercise clause of the Constitution pro-
tected the Catholic minority from the virulent anti-Catholic prejudice of
the Know-Nothings and cultural isolationists. Catholics must now accord
the same constitutional safeguards to all other persons, without aban-
doning the effort to teach moral values in public schools.
The contemporary necessity of according sufficient constitutional re-
spect for everyone's free exercise rights, while avoiding establishment of
religion, is obvious. If the Ten Commandments are starkly posted on a
public school bulletin board, which version of the Ten Commandments
would be displayed-Protestant, Catholic or Jewish? If each different
version were posted, would public school teachers be able to explain the
theological differences sufficiently in response to students' questions?
And what of the constitutional rights of the Buddhist or Moslem
child? Can agnostic or atheist children be made the subtle targets for
religious proselytizing, under the guise of teaching moral values? The
same questions are raised if the Bible is read or if school-sponsored
prayers are said aloud, apart from a broader educational context of a
literature, history, or comparative religion class. What sort of prayers
would be said? Which holy scripture would be read? The Torah? The
'8 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 67 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
29 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
31 CATHOLIc LAWYER, No. 3
Koran? The Protestant or Catholic Bible? Again, what of the constitu-
tional rights of other students? Assuming even that the public school
reading from a Catholic Bible began the public school day, should not
Catholics be wary of a stark Bible reading without the presence of a
faculty sufficiently versed in Catholic theology to address student ques-
tions that the scriptural reading may inspire? Thus, even in an "ideal"
context, public school-sponsored prayer or scripture reading is deeply
problematic, especially for the Catholic minority. Few, if any, want to
witness their religion debased by a tepid state-sponsored Christianization
political agenda.
These difficult questions must not derail the ethical renaissance of
teaching moral values in public schools. It may be possible to teach mo-
rality without simultaneously teaching overt religious values. For most
Americans, religion and morality are closely and properly bound. But it is
precisely for this reason, the synergy, indeed the near-fungibility of overt
religious and moral values, that the Constitution compels meticulous re-
gard for both the establishment and free exercise clauses of the first
amendment.
Teaching moral values in public schools can be accomplished within
the bounds of the Constitution. It is a constitutionally permissible, and,
given the rich natural law tradition reflected in the constitutionally ante-
cedent Declaration of Independence, a constitutionally endorsed pedagog-
ical agenda. However, moral values must be taught with care, respect, and
concern for the rights of all the public. This requires constitutional regard
for cultural heterogeneity, and care to ensure against exclusive promulga-
tion of any particular set of religious values to the exclusion of all other
values. Anything less will probably violate the religion clauses of the Con-
stitution. If done with constitutional prudence, moral values can be
taught without ineluctably sliding down the dangerous slippery slope of
accommodationism. 30
It is unnecessary and irresponsible to mistakenly yield the high moral
ground and to succumb to raw value neutrality. The Constitution does
not require such abdication of responsibility by public educators. Moral
values can be legitimately taught without becoming unconstitutionally
transmogrified into a political agenda for a particular religious view. How-
ever, without due regard for both of the Constitution's religion clauses,
efforts to teach moral values in schools are doomed. Teaching moral val-
ues must not be equated with ambitious proselytizing for a particular reli-
gion, to the exclusion of all other values. This unconstitutional parochial-
ism ineluctably leads to the repugnant intellectual terrorism of banning
" See Gregory, supra note 14.
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certain books"' on various purported objectionable grounds, and, ulti-
mately to mass home schooling and de facto disavowal of legitimate pub-
lic education.
Those who object to teaching moral values in public schools argue
that it is the ominous pretext for effectuating religious proselytization,
and thus violates the establishment clause. This is a potentially legiti-
mate concern. However, as has been demonstrated, moral values can and
must be carefully taught without violating the Constitution. It is not ap-
propriate for critics to argue that those who wish to teach moral values
should instead exercise the option of attending private religious schools.
Parochial schools have done an excellent job of opening their doors to the
indigent, unable to afford private school tuition, and even to those not of
the same religious faith who nevertheless seek the highest quality educa-
tion available.32 However, the ability of private religious schools to waive
tuition for those unable to pay is not limitless. It is facile and transpar-
ently specious for those opposed to the teaching of moral values in public
schools to argue that private religious schools are automatically available
as the alternative means for those who desire an education expressly in-
corporating moral values. For reasons of both geographic and potential
economic inaccessabilty, this counterargument fails. Meanwhile, students
unable to attend private religious schools retain their constitutional right
to have their free exercise of religion respected in the public school con-
text. Although students in public schools may be exposed to a panorama
of values antithetical to their own religious beliefs as the heavy price of
constitutional protection against establishment of religion, they must not
thereby be relegated to a debased, value-neutral, or anti-religion public
education. Their free exercise constitutional right provides the effective
counterbalance to ensure that moral values, if taught in an appropriate
context, can be a constitutional part of public education.
Our Constitution and our public schools must be both open and prin-
cipled enough to accommodate the teaching of moral values in public ed-
ucation within the scope of the first amendment. If neither the Constitu-
tion nor public schools are open to morality-based pedagogy, society will
"' See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982); Smith v. Board of School Comm'rs, 655
F. Supp. 939 (S.D. Ala. 1987); N.Y. Times, May 10, 1987, at § 7; Trends in the Law, War
Between the Faiths: "Secular humanist" Books Banned, 73 A.B.A. J. 128 (June 1987). See
also Nat'l L.J., July 27, 1987, at 6, col. 1 (Upon hearing Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of
Education, Nos. 86-6144, 86-6179, 86-6180, 87-5024, slip op. (6th Cir. Aug. 24, 1987), Sixth
Circuit panel appeared "highly critical" of claim that elementary school children have right
to skip reading classes when texts conflict with their religious beliefs).
"2 Laycock, Towards A General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor
Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1373, 1387 (1981) ("[Tlhe
... success of Catholic schools [is] in educating disadvantaged children. These children are
frequently black Protestants whose public schools have failed them.").
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be gravely and perhaps irreparably debilitated by such a craven, unwar-
ranted bar. Concomitantly, those fanatics who would sweep aside the
Constitution in order to promulgate their particular religious agenda to
the exclusion of other perspectives should take heed from the example of
the quintessential lawyer and Catholic saint, Thomas More. Recall More's
response to his son-in-law, Roper, in Bolt's timeless play, A Man For All
Seasons. Roper was puzzled when More let an enemy go because he vio-
lated no law. Roper claimed he gladly would "cut down every law in Eng-
land" to get at the Devil. As More rhetorically queried, what would then
protect Roper when, the laws having been swept aside in the ambitious
political chase, the Devil then turned and faced Roper? 3 Analogously,
what will protect the Catholic minority? If, in ill-advised haste, we dero-
gate the constitutional rights of others in order to advance our own reli-
gious agenda in the public schools, we then have no constitutional guar-
antee that we will be legally protected from discrimination against us by a
secular, morally-neutral, and perhaps even anti-Catholic, political and
public majority. Now, as then, the law protects perhaps even the Devil, in
order to protect us ultimately from the Devil. Today, the Constitution
also protects our Catholic right to insist upon the informed teaching of
moral values in public school education. Ultimately, a morally sensitive
and educated public citizenry will be best protected against, and best pre-
pared to frustrate, evil in the modern world.
33 And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned round on you-where would
you hide, Roper, the laws being flat? This country's planted this with laws from coast
to coast-Man's laws, not God's-and if you cut them down ... d'you really think
you could stand upright in the winds that would blow then?
R. MARIUS, THOMAS MORE (1984); Gregory, Book Review, 29 CATH. LAw. 344 (1985).
